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Abstract 
We propose that humans have an implicit bias to generalize information about the members of a 
category to the category itself, when appropriate. This proposal complements recent arguments 
that category- or kind-based reasoning is particularly low-effort and may thus be privileged in 
human cognition (e.g., Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012). To test our proposal, we asked 
participants to remember two types of novel facts: kind-wide (generic) facts (e.g., facts about 
zorbs) and universally quantified facts (e.g., facts about all stups). Half of the facts concerned 
properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), 
and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their 
hair). We predicted that, due to the hypothesized bias, participants would spontaneously 
generalize the quantified facts about generalizable properties to the corresponding kinds, and 
would do so more frequently than for the facts about idiosyncratic properties. In turn, these 
implicit generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified-to-generic memory conversions 
for the generalizable properties. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with this 
prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable versus idiosyncratic difference occurred under 
cognitive load (Experiment 1), suggesting that the hypothesized bias requires few cognitive 
resources, and when controlling for potential differences across these two types of properties in 
the similarity/confusability of quantified and generic statements (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 
ruled out the possibility that these results were an artifact of the memory clues provided to 
participants. These studies provide evidence for our proposal of an implicit bias to draw 
generalizations about kinds. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Humans conceive of the world as being populated not just by unique individuals (e.g., the 
tall leafy thing in the front yard) but also by kinds of things (e.g., trees). What’s more, we 
routinely acquire and store knowledge at the level of these abstract kinds, and we use this 
knowledge with amazing flexibility to communicate with one another, explain the world around 
us, and predict future outcomes (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Markman, 1989; Murphy, 2004; Smith & 
Medin, 1981). These achievements are all the more remarkable considering that we do not in fact 
have perceptual access to kinds per se—only to particular samples. To some researchers, the 
accumulated evidence in the psychology of concepts has suggested that, beyond being merely 
capable of reasoning about kinds, human cognition may actually be structured so as to privilege 
the processing of information at this general level (e.g., Gelman, 2010; Hampton, 2012; 
Hollander, Gelman, & Star, 2002; Leslie, 2008, 2012). 
According to these arguments, reasoning about kinds requires few cognitive resources 
compared to reasoning about sets of comparable scope. Consider some of the developmental 
evidence on this point. Children’s ability to evaluate claims about entire kinds (e.g., “Do girls 
have curly hair?”) is adult-like starting at around the age of 3, whereas their ability to evaluate 
claims about similarly broad quantified sets (e.g., “Do all girls have curly hair?”) has a much 
more protracted developmental course (Hollander et al., 2002; Mannheim, Gelman, Escalante, 
Huayhua, & Puma, 2011; Tardif, Gelman, Fu, & Zhu, 2012). This developmental pattern—
which has been found in children learning languages from three different language families 
(English, Mandarin, and Quechua)—is particularly striking when taking into account the fact 
that, from the perspective of formal semantics, statements about kinds are more complex than 
quantified statements. To illustrate the formal complexity of statements about kinds (or generic 
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statements), consider that one can truthfully say that mosquitoes carry malaria but not that books 
are paperbacks, even though the majority of books are paperbacks, and only a tiny percentage of 
mosquitoes carry malaria (e.g., Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg, 2013). Because of 
puzzling examples such as these, a formal account of the truth conditions of generic statements 
has eluded semanticists for over 40 years (e.g., Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Lawler, 1973; but see 
Leslie, 2008). In contrast, specifying the truth conditions for quantified statements is often 
formally simple (e.g., the truth of a universally quantified statement is determined by a clear rule: 
the statement is true only if every single category member has the described property). Thus, the 
cognitive ease with which children understand generics (which are formally complex), coupled 
with the cognitive difficulties children encounter with quantified claims (which are formally 
simple), is suggestive of a bias in the architecture of our cognitive systems—a bias that enables 
reasoning about kinds to be so effortless that even young children can perform such formally 
complex reasoning competently. 
These ease-of-processing claims (i.e., that reasoning about kinds requires few cognitive 
resources) are not restricted to children. For instance, when adults have to evaluate or remember 
quantified facts, they often respond as if these facts were about kinds (Leslie & Gelman, 2012; 
Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011; Meyer, Gelman, & Stilwell, 2011). To illustrate, Leslie 
and Gelman (2012) asked children and adults to remember both generic facts (e.g., “Bees have 
five eyes”) and quantified facts (e.g., “All bees have five eyes”) for a later memory test. At both 
ages, participants were more likely to mistakenly recall quantified statements as being instead 
generics, rather than recalling generics as quantified statements. This result, which was bolstered 
by follow-up studies ruling out alternative explanations, seems consistent with the ease-of-
processing argument above: If quantified information is more cognitively challenging to process 
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and store than the corresponding generic information, then participants may inadvertently default 
to the latter and thus recall quantified information as generic.  
Evidence for the ease-of-processing account is also provided by Hampton’s (2012) 
argument concerning the relative difficulty of extensional and intensional reasoning (see also 
Jönsson & Hampton, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). According to Hampton, extensional 
reasoning (that is, reasoning in terms of frequencies and sets) is more cognitively demanding 
than intensional reasoning (that is, reasoning in terms of kinds and their generic properties). As a 
result, when people are asked to reason extensionally (e.g., to judge the truth value of a 
universally quantified statement), they often fail to do so and instead inadvertently fall back on 
an intensional, kind-based mode of reasoning, leading to characteristic errors of judgment (e.g., 
mistakenly judging the truth value of a universally quantified statement as if it were generic; see 
also Leslie, Khemlani, & Glucksberg, 2011).  
 In the present paper, we identify a new, and powerful, bias that encourages the formation 
of kind representations. Specifically, we propose that human cognition may be biased to 
spontaneously generalize information about particular samples to the entire relevant kinds 
whenever such generalizations are warranted. Similar to the ease-of-processing bias described 
above, this generalization bias gives rise to many kind representations that we would not have 
formed otherwise. However, the process by which it does so is quite different: The kind 
representations created through the hypothesized generalization bias are not the byproducts of an 
inability to process quantified information—they are not the side effects of our cognitive 
limitations. Rather, they are the outcome of inferences (inductive generalizations, to be more 
precise) that our cognitive systems perform when encountering quantified information about sets 
of objects in the world. We should also clarify that these generalizations are not performed 
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because of a conscious, explicit intention to do so; the hypothesized generalization bias is 
implicit. Just as people make spontaneous inferences about, say, an individual’s traits and goals 
without really intending to do so (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 
2008), our account proposes that people spontaneously, and implicitly, generalize quantified 
evidence about particular samples (e.g., these trees have leaves) to the level of entire categories 
(e.g., trees have leaves). 
Our proposal of a generalization bias is consistent with the research suggesting that 
people are quite willing to draw kind-wide conclusions from relatively sparse evidence. For 
example, adults often judge that a property that is present in a minority of the members of a kind 
(e.g., 30% of morseths have silver fur) is likely to be true of the kind as a whole (e.g., morseths, 
as a kind, have silver fur; Cimpian, Brandone, & Gelman, 2010). Similarly, the developmental 
literature on inductive inferences has suggested that even very young children generalize 
information from one member of a kind to another arbitrary member—and thus, arguably, to the 
entire kind (e.g., Keates & Graham, 2008; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Graham, Kilbreath, 
& Welder, 2004; Sutherland & Friedman, 2012, in press; see also Cimpian & Park, in press; 
Csibra & Gergely, 2009). 
These findings, however, do not provide evidence for a bias to draw spontaneous kind 
generalizations. These previous results suggest that people will often draw conclusions about 
kinds when they are provided with explicit opportunities to do so. For instance, Cimpian and 
colleagues’ (2010) data show that people generalize certain quantified facts to the level of kinds 
when they are asked whether these generalizations are warranted. It is unclear, however, if 
people would have drawn the generic conclusions they did without the experimenter’s prompt. 
To make strong claims about an implicit bias to generalize to categories, we would need 
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evidence that this hypothesized bias provides an impetus to generalize in the absence of external 
incentives—or, perhaps, even in the presence of disincentives. 
In the studies reported here, we tested whether people spontaneously generalize 
quantified evidence to the level of a kind in the context of a task that discourages such 
generalizations (because they lead to incorrect answers). The task, modeled after Leslie and 
Gelman (2012), is ostensibly about people’s memory for generic and quantified facts about novel 
animals. In reality, however, our reason for adopting it was that it can reveal whether people use 
the evidence provided by the quantified facts (e.g., all zorbs eat fruits and vegetables) to draw 
spontaneous generalizations about the relevant kinds (e.g., zorbs eat fruits and vegetables). If 
participants did so, their gist memory for the quantified facts would arguably be influenced by 
these generalizations; as a result, they may misremember some of the facts that were originally 
quantified as being generic on a memory test. Such generalization-induced memory errors, if 
they occurred, would be both spontaneous (rather than externally prompted) and counter to the 
incentive structure of the task (where accurate memory was the only criterion for success). Thus, 
from the novel perspective outlined here, the evidence from this task could speak to the presence 
of an implicit bias to generalize to categories. 
The use of this memory paradigm, however, gives rise to an obvious problem: The 
prediction of our generalization bias is at this point indistinguishable from that of the ease-of-
processing bias—both predict frequent conversions from quantified to generic form, albeit for 
different reasons: In contrast to our account, the ease-of-processing account suggests that these 
conversions are not a result of spontaneous generalizations but rather of the resource-intensive 
nature of processing quantified information, which should lead participants to inadvertently fall 
back on the easier-to-process kind representations. To circumvent this ambiguity, we 
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manipulated the content of the facts participants were asked to remember. That is, half of the 
facts described properties that are typically generalizable to an entire animal kind (e.g., diet, 
habitat), whereas the other half described properties that are typically idiosyncratic to a particular 
individual (e.g., temporary states, accidents). Given the extensive evidence that kind 
generalizations are sensitive to the content of the property being generalized (e.g., Cimpian et al., 
2010; Cimpian & Markman, 2008; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Shipley, 1993), 
the hypothesized generalization bias should be correspondingly sensitive to the content of the 
facts. That is, people should be more likely to spontaneously make kind generalizations when the 
quantified evidence concerns properties that would plausibly apply to an entire animal kind than 
when the quantified evidence concerns properties that are typically not kind-relevant. As a result, 
people should be significantly more likely to misremember quantified facts as generic when the 
facts are about generalizable properties than when they are about idiosyncratic properties.  
Importantly, this prediction is distinct from the prediction of the ease-of-processing 
claim, which provides no reason to expect an asymmetry in memory errors for generic and 
quantified facts based on the content of the properties they describe. The ease-of-processing 
account would instead predict that a quantified fact, regardless of what type of property it is 
about, is still quantified and thus would be more cognitively taxing to remember, causing people 
to fall back on an easier-to-process kind representation. 
Given that the generalization bias is hypothesized to be implicit, we might further 
hypothesize that it requires minimal cognitive resources for its operation, working quietly 
“behind the scenes” to enrich our conceptual knowledge. We explored this issue empirically by 
placing half of the participants under a cognitive load while they were encoding the quantified 
and generic statements. If the bias to generalize to kinds operates without requiring much 
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cognitive effort, then the participants who are under cognitive load should also misremember the 
quantified facts as generic more often when these facts are about generalizable (vs. idiosyncratic) 
properties.  
 To summarize, we proposed that people have an implicit bias to generalize information 
about particular samples to the level of entire categories. If such a bias were in place, then it is 
likely that one symptom of it would be a tendency to make spontaneous kind generalizations 
more often in contexts where the evidence at hand licensed such generalizations. In the current 
memory paradigm, these spontaneous generalizations should lead people to recall quantified 
facts as generic more often when these facts are about generalizable properties than when they 
are about idiosyncratic properties. By manipulating whether participants had to perform a 
concurrent task while encoding the generic and quantified facts, we were also able to test 
whether this bias requires only minimal cognitive resources to operate. Experiments 1 and 2 
provide consistent evidence for these predictions. In addition, Experiments 2 and 3 address two 
alternative explanations for the findings.  
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
2.1 Method 
 Participants. The participants were 187 undergraduate students from a large public 
university in the Midwestern US. All were native English speakers. The reward for participation 
was course credit or $5. Participants were randomly assigned to either a No Load (n = 93) or a 
Cognitive Load (n = 94) condition. 
 Items. We used 16 facts about novel animals (see Table 1), each of which could be 
presented either as universally quantified (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”) or as 
generic (e.g., “Zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”). However, the same fact was never presented in 
both forms to the same participant. In addition, half of the facts described generalizable 
properties (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half described idiosyncratic properties (e.g., 
getting mud in their hair). The generalizable and idiosyncratic properties were matched in length 
(both Ms = 4.75 words). Moreover, in a separate norming study, we asked participants (N = 43) 
to judge how many members of a kind were likely to possess these properties (e.g., “If you had 
to guess, what percentage of stups get mud in their hair?”) given that at least one member of the 
kind had the property. The results confirmed that all of the generalizable properties were indeed 
judged to be more generalizable (range = 75.1% to 85.7% of category members have the 
property) than all of the idiosyncratic properties (range = 14.0% to 55.4%); this difference was 
significant, Mgeneralizable = 80.9% versus  Midiosyncratic = 42.2%, t(42) = 9.56, p < .001. 
 The 16 facts were presented in one of three random orders, each of which had two 
versions. The three random orders were generated with the constraint that no more than three 
facts of the same form (i.e., “all” or generic) or containing the same type of property (i.e., 
generalizable or idiosyncratic) should occur in a row. The two versions of each order were 
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identical except with respect to the generic/universal form of each fact: If a fact was generic in 
one version, it was universally quantified in the other version, and vice versa. 
 Procedure and Design. Testing occurred in small groups of up to six participants. To 
avoid overwhelming participants’ memory capacity, the 16 facts were split into two blocks of 
eight, each of which contained four facts in generic form and four in “all” form, as well as four 
generalizable and four idiosyncratic properties. The same three-phase procedure, described next, 
was followed for both blocks. 
 1) Learning phase. In the No Load condition, the experimenter asked participants to pay 
close attention for a later recall test. Then, she read aloud the eight facts from the first block. As 
the participants listened to the facts, they followed along in a booklet. Each page in this booklet 
contained a line drawing of the novel animal that was referenced in the corresponding fact. The 
procedure for the Cognitive Load condition was identical, except that participants were also 
asked to rehearse a string of six digits while listening to the facts and following along in their 
booklets. Immediately after listening to the facts, participants were asked to recall the digits in 
the order in which they were presented (for similar methods of inducing cognitive demands, see 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).  
 2) Distractor phase. All participants were then asked to complete a four-minute distractor 
task in which they completed a series of multi-digit multiplication problems. 
 3) Recall phase. Next, participants received a second booklet with the same drawings as 
the booklet from the learning phase. Participants were asked to go through the booklet and write 
what they remembered of the sentences that the experimenter had read for each page. Because 
our main interest was in participants’ memory for the scope of the facts (generic vs. “all”) rather 
than in their memory for the content of these facts, we provided two strong clues to the content 
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of each sentence: the bare singular form of the relevant novel noun (e.g., zorb) and an additional 
noun from the fact (e.g., vegetable; see Table 1 for full list of clues).  
Once participants finished writing down their recall responses for the first block, the three 
phases (learning, distractor, and recall) were repeated for the second block of eight sentences.
1
  
The design of our study can be summarized as follows: 2 (fact form: generic vs. “all”; 
within subject) × 2 (property type: generalizable vs. idiosyncratic; within subject) × 2 (cognitive 
load: load vs. no load; between subjects). 
 Coding. One researcher coded participants’ recalled sentences into one of three mutually 
exclusive categories depending on their scope: generic, “all,” and “other” (which also included 
failures to recall anything). If a sentence was about a kind as a whole (e.g., “Zorbs like to eat 
vegetables”), it was coded as generic.2 If a sentence was about all members of a kind (e.g., “All 
zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”), it was coded as “all.” If a sentence was about a single instance 
of a kind
3
 or had indeterminate scope (e.g., “Eat fruits and vegetables”), it was coded as “other.” 
These three categories accounted for 49.7%, 31.0%, and 19.4% of participants’ responses, 
respectively. A second researcher, blind to the load condition and the original form of the fact, 
                                                 
1
 Approximately half of the participants received a slight variant of this procedure, in which (1) the booklets used 
during the learning phase listed the same two clues as those in the recall phase (rather than no clues), and (2) the 
Cognitive Load condition involved rehearsing a string of eight digits (rather than six). Because this procedural 
variant did not interact significantly with either of the variables of interest (property type and cognitive load), we 
report the data collapsed across it. 
2
 The vast majority of sentences coded as generic had either bare plural noun phrases (e.g., “Reesles like to swim in 
the ocean”) or indefinite singular noun phrases (e.g., “A dax stores its food in its cheeks”) in the subject position. 
However, we also coded as generic a number of sentences with (what appeared to be) bare singular noun phrases in 
the subject position (e.g., “Glippet keep their nests on mountain peaks”). This coding decision was based on the 
assumption that some participants may have been unsure of how to pluralize the novel nouns provided (e.g., some 
may have thought that the plural of glippet may be glippet, on analogy with sheep or deer). This latter type of 
generic accounted for only 5.3% of responses coded as generic. Moreover, when the data were analyzed without 
these generics, the results replicated those reported in the main text. Also note that we did not code definite singular 
noun phrases as generic. Even though such noun phrases can in principle refer to a kind, their generic use is rare 
(e.g., Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998). Moreover, since one of the clues provided to 
participants was a picture of a single exemplar from the relevant category, the task context made it very likely that 
subjects’ definite singular nouns (e.g., “the oller”) were referring to the exemplars on the page in front of them. 
3
 Statements about single instances accounted for 11.8% of responses (Mgeneralizable = 10.6%; Midiosyncratic = 13.0%).  
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coded the responses of 167 of the 187 subjects (20 subjects were used for training). Cohen’s 
kappas for the generic, “all,” and “other” coding categories were .97, 1.0, and .95, respectively, 
and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
We also coded Cognitive Load participants’ memory for the digits they were asked to 
rehearse while they were listening to the facts. Two researchers independently rated each 
participant’s recalled digit strings on a scale from 1 [completely wrong or missing] to 5 
[completely correct].
4
 Inter-rater agreement was high, r = .93. Each subject’s final rating was the 
average of the two researchers’ ratings, except in cases where their scores differed by more than 
one point. In such cases, the researchers discussed the disagreement and reached a mutually 
agreeable rating. 
 Dependent Measure. In light of the prior evidence for the efficiency of kind-based 
computations (e.g., Hollander et al., 2002; Leslie & Gelman, 2012), it is likely that participants 
will, on the whole, be more likely to mistakenly recall “all” statements as generic rather than the 
reverse. Our proposal of a bias to generalize to categories makes two additional predictions: (1) 
the magnitude of the asymmetry in memory errors across fact form (i.e., more “all”-to-generic 
than generic-to-“all” conversion errors) should be greater when the facts concern generalizable 
properties than when they concern idiosyncratic properties, and (2) this property effect should be 
observed even when participants have few cognitive resources available.  
To test these predictions, we calculated the difference score between “all”-to-generic and 
generic-to-“all” memory conversions, separately for the generalizable and the idiosyncratic 
properties. This calculation proceeded in two steps.  First, we calculated the percentage of 
statements that were originally presented in “all” form (eight per participant) that were instead 
                                                 
4
 The intermediary scale points were labeled as follows: 2 [very few correct numbers in the correct order], 3 [some 
of the correct numbers in the correct order], and 4 [minor errors (e.g., one number missing or out of order)]. 
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recalled in generic form, and the percentage of statements originally presented in generic form 
(eight per participant) that were instead recalled in “all” form. These conversion scores were 
calculated for each individual participant, separately for the generalizable and idiosyncratic 
properties. Second, we took each participant’s percentages of “all”-to-generic conversions and 
subtracted from them the participant’s percentages of generic-to-“all” conversions, again 
separately for the generalizable and idiosyncratic properties. Thus, each participant received two 
final difference scores (one for each property type), which we will refer to as generalization-bias 
scores from here on. 
 Our predictions can be assessed by testing, first, whether participants’ generalization-bias 
scores are higher for facts that describe generalizable properties than for facts that describe 
idiosyncratic properties, and second, whether this difference is present both when cognitive 
resources are intact and when they are taxed.  
2.2 Results 
Data Analysis Strategy. Participants’ generalization-bias scores clustered in the upper 
half of the range and were thus non-normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test, p < .001). Because 
of this violation of parametric assumptions, we analyzed the data using ordinal logistic 
regressions (OLRs) computed using the Generalized Estimating Equations command in SPSS. 
Cognitive load was a between-subjects factor in this analysis, and property type was a within-
subject factor.
5
 
 Cognitive Load Manipulation Checks. If participants in the Cognitive Load condition 
complied with our instructions to rehearse the string of digits provided by the experimenter, then 
they should have reasonably accurate memory for these digits. Very poor digit recall is most 
                                                 
5
 Despite the assumption violations, the results of the OLRs were replicated with analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
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likely a sign that the subjects did not rehearse the digits and were not actually under a cognitive 
load (see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, for a similar argument). Thus, we excluded from the analyses 
any subjects whose average digit memory scores were below 2 on the 1–5 scale described in the 
Method (n = 13; Mdigit memory = 1.37). This left 81 subjects in the Cognitive Load condition. (Note 
that all of the significant results reported below remain significant even if these subjects are not 
excluded.) 
 As an additional check that the 81 remaining Cognitive Load participants were indeed 
under a load, we tested their accuracy on the primary task (fact recall) relative to the participants 
in the No Load condition. If the cognitive load imposed a burden on working memory resources, 
Cognitive Load participants should have less accurate memory compared to participants in the 
No Load condition. Consistent with this prediction, Cognitive Load participants were 
significantly less likely than No Load participants to recall the facts in the correct form (Ms = 
38.0% and 52.2% of responses were recalled in the correct form, respectively), Wald χ²(1) = 
28.98, p < .001, d = 0.75 (see also Table 2 and the Appendix). Thus, it seems reasonable to 
assume that our cognitive load manipulation was successful in inducing different cognitive 
demands on the two groups of participants. 
 First Prediction: A Main Effect of Property Type. To reiterate, we proposed that 
people have an implicit bias to make kind generalizations. In the context of our task, this bias 
might prompt spontaneous generalizations to the kind level especially when the evidence 
warrants such generalizations. Thus, when a novel property is generalizable—the sort of property 
that is typically true of kinds—participants may be particularly likely to make implicit inferences 
using the quantified evidence at hand (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”) to generalize to 
the kind itself (e.g., zorbs, as a kind, have this sort of diet). These generalizations, should they 
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occur, would lead to higher generalization-bias scores for generalizable properties than for 
idiosyncratic properties. In line with this prediction, the OLR revealed a significant main effect 
of property type, such that participants had higher generalization-bias scores for facts about 
generalizable properties (M = 24.1% more “all”-to-generic than generic-to-“all” conversions) 
than for facts about idiosyncratic properties (M = 16.0%), Wald χ²(1) = 12.11, p = .001, d = .13.6  
We also explored whether the effect of property type held up at the level of individual 
participants. Specifically, we compared the number of participants who had higher 
generalization-bias scores for the generalizable than for the idiosyncratic properties with the 
number of participants who had the opposite pattern (higher generalization-bias scores for 
idiosyncratic properties). Consistent with our prediction, there were significantly more 
participants with higher generalization-bias scores for the generalizable properties (37.9% of 
participants) than participants with higher generalization-bias scores for the idiosyncratic 
properties (17.8% of participants), p < .001 by a sign test. 
 Second Prediction: An Effect of Property Type in Both the Cognitive Load and the 
No Load Conditions. We also hypothesized that the bias to generalize to kinds operates without 
much cognitive effort. Thus, our second prediction was that this bias should influence 
participants’ memory regardless of whether or not they are asked to perform another task while 
listening to the experimenter’s facts. In other words, we predicted that there would be a 
statistically significant effect of property type in both the No Load and the Cognitive Load 
conditions. We did not, however, make a priori predictions about whether we would obtain a 
significant Property Type × Cognitive Load interaction. On the one hand, it is possible that the 
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 These generalization-bias scores were significantly greater than zero both for the generalizable properties (one-
sample Wilcoxon test, Z = 4.92, p < .001) and for the idiosyncratic properties (one-sample Wilcoxon test, Z = 3.13, 
p = .002), indicating that there were significantly more “all”-to-generic than generic-to-“all” conversions for both of 
these types of facts. These differences are consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Leslie & Gelman, 2012) that suggests 
a general tendency to misremember quantified information instead as generic. 
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hypothesized bias to make kind inferences would require so few resources that it would be 
wholly insensitive to different levels of cognitive demands (Logan, 1979); in this case, no 
significant interaction should be found. We were open, however, to the possibility that subjects 
under a cognitive load might be prevented from drawing as many kind inferences as they would 
otherwise, which could lead to a smaller (but, we predict, still significant) difference between the 
generalization-bias scores for generalizable and idiosyncratic properties. In sum, we did not 
make strong predictions about whether there would be a significant Property Type × Cognitive 
Load interaction—only that the effect of property type would be significant in both conditions.  
Consistent with our prediction, participants’ generalization-bias scores were higher for 
statements that described generalizable properties than statements that described idiosyncratic 
properties, both for those who were not under load, Wald χ²(1) = 6.63, p = .010, d = 0.15, and for 
those under a cognitive load, Wald χ²(1) = 5.41, p = .020, d = 0.12. Additionally, there was no 
significant difference between the magnitude of the property type effect in each load condition, 
as the OLR revealed no trace of an interaction between property type and cognitive load, Wald 
χ²(1) = 0.08, p = .782 (see Table 2 and the Appendix for means).7 
Individual participants’ response patterns pointed to the same conclusion: There were 
significantly more participants who had higher generalization-bias scores for the generalizable 
(vs. the idiosyncratic) properties than participants who had higher scores for the idiosyncratic 
(vs. the generalizable) properties in both the No Load and the Cognitive Load conditions, ps = 
.005 and .053, respectively, by sign tests. 
2.3 Discussion 
To summarize, we found that participants were more likely to misremember quantified 
                                                 
7
 The main effect of cognitive load was not significant either, MNo Load = 18.3% vs. MCognitive Load = 22.1% more “all”-
to-generic than generic-to-“all” conversions, Wald χ²(1) = 0.15, p = .696, d = 0.06. 
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facts as generic (rather than vice-versa) when these facts were about properties that are typically 
generalizable to a kind (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”) than when they were about 
properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., “All stups get mud in their hair”). This 
finding is in line with our main proposal that people have an implicit bias to make spontaneous 
kind generalizations and are therefore likely to generalize quantified evidence to kinds whenever 
such generalizations are warranted. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation for these findings. Perhaps people don’t 
generalize the quantified evidence about generalizable properties to the relevant kinds, as we 
hypothesized. Rather, universally quantified and generic statements may simply be closer in 
their meaning—and thus more confusable—when they describe generalizable properties than 
when they describe idiosyncratic properties. For instance, hearing that “zorbs eat fruits and 
vegetables” might lead people to expect that the vast majority of zorbs do so (Cimpian et al., 
2010), which would then make this statement similar in meaning with a statement such as “All 
zorbs eat fruits and vegetables.” If generic and “all” statements are seen as meaning roughly the 
same thing in this particular case, then people might just produce the shorter of the two 
statements at recall, leading to an increased rate of “all”-to-generic conversions compared to 
generic-to-“all” conversions. (Again, no kind generalizations of the sort we hypothesize are 
invoked by this alternative account.) In contrast, generic statements about idiosyncratic 
properties (e.g., “Stups get mud in their hair”) may not be seen as being similar/confusable in 
meaning with the corresponding universally quantified statements (e.g., “All stups get mud in 
their hair”), in part because generics about such properties suggest relatively low prevalence 
levels (Cimpian et al., 2010, Experiment 3). For idiosyncratic properties, then, people may be 
less inclined to use the shorter generic statements as stand-ins for universally quantified 
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statements (because their meanings are not seen as interchangeable), leading to lower, and more 
symmetrical, numbers of “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” errors.  
Although intuitively plausible, this alternative cannot explain other aspects of the results 
obtained in Experiment 1. For example, if generic and “all” statements are more confusable for 
generalizable properties, then it is hard to explain why the percentage of correct responses for 
these properties (M = 46.5%) was nearly identical to the percentage of correct responses for the 
supposedly less-confusable generic and “all” statements about idiosyncratic properties (M = 
44.8%; Wilcoxon Z = 1.23, p = .222). The confusability alternative straightforwardly predicts 
that people should be correct less often for the generalizable properties. This result, however, is 
suggestive but not conclusive, so we conducted Experiment 2 in order to provide a more 
definitive test of this alternative explanation. Specifically, we measured and statistically adjusted 
for the perceived similarity/confusability of “all” and generic statements about generalizable and 
idiosyncratic properties. If the confusability alternative were correct, then taking participants’ 
judgments of meaning similarity into account when testing for an effect of property type should 
eliminate the difference in generalization-bias scores observed in Experiment 1. In contrast, we 
predicted that the effect of property type on generalization-bias scores would replicate even 
when controlling for this measure of similarity/confusability. 
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
3.1 Method 
 Participants. Eighty-six participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform and completed the study online. All were native English speakers residing in the US. 
The reward for participation was $0.75. 
 Items. We used the same items as in Experiment 1. 
 Procedure. The procedure was similar to the No Load condition of Experiment 1, with a 
few methodological changes necessitated by (1) the switch from in-lab to online testing, and (2) 
the addition of the key control variable of this experiment (namely, similarity/confusability). 
  The changes were as follows. First, instead of listening to the sentences while looking at 
a booklet, participants read the sentences on their computer screens, each on a separate page. 
Each page was programmed to automatically advance after 15 seconds in order to equate 
encoding time across sentences. To ensure that the participants attended to the stimulus 
sentences, we also required them to type out these sentences in a text box on the page on which 
they were displayed. Second, the distractor phase was shortened to two minutes rather than four. 
A two-minute delay is more in line with the brevity of typical studies on Mechanical Turk, and 
yet it is still long enough to ensure that participants had to rely on long-term memory at recall 
(e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1959). Third, the distractor task consisted of arithmetic problems that 
could be solved without needing a pen and paper, unlike the multi-digit multiplication problems 
used in Experiment 1. Fourth, to assess the similarity/confusability of “all” and generic 
statements describing generalizable and idiosyncratic properties, we presented participants with 
all 16 pairs of generic and “all” statements (e.g., “Stups get mud in their hair” and “All stups get 
mud in their hair”; see Table 1) and asked them to rate how similar in meaning these pairs were 
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(“How similar are the meanings of these two sentences?”). Participants marked their answers on 
a 10-point scale (from 1 = “very dissimilar” to 10 = “very similar”). Each pair was presented on 
a different screen. The order of the 16 pairs was randomized for each subject. Also, the order in 
which the generic and “all” sentences were displayed within the pairs was randomized across 
participants. These rating questions were always presented after the recall phase so as to not 
interfere with the memory task. 
 Because online testing makes cheating on the memory task a possibility, at the very end 
of the session we asked participants to report whether they had written down, copied, or used any 
other external sources to help them remember the sentences. To encourage truthful responses, we 
made it very clear to participants that they would receive payment regardless of how they 
answered this question. Two participants reported cheating and were excluded, leaving 84 
participants in our sample. 
 Coding. The coding scheme was the same as in Experiment 1. Inter-coder agreement was 
calculated over all 84 transcripts and was again excellent: Cohen’s kappas for the generic, “all,” 
and “other” coding categories were .97, .99, and .94, respectively. Disagreements were resolved 
through discussion. 
 Dependent Measures. Generalization-bias scores were calculated just as in Experiment 
1, by taking the difference between “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” memory conversions 
separately for the generalizable and the idiosyncratic properties. Participants’ similarity scores 
were also calculated separately for the two property types by averaging the similarity ratings for 
the eight generalizable items and the eight idiosyncratic items. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
 Our claim is that people make more asymmetric memory errors (more “all”-to-generic 
20 
than generic-to-“all” conversions) for generalizable than for idiosyncratic properties because of 
an implicit bias to generalize to kinds, and not because of low-level factors having to do with the 
confusability of generic and universally quantified statements describing these types of 
properties. Thus, we predicted that generalization-bias scores would be significantly higher for 
the generalizable than for the idiosyncratic properties even when adjusting for any differences 
between the similarity/confusability of “all” and generic statements about the two property 
types.  
 To begin, we examined whether such similarity/confusability differences exist in the first 
place. Participants did in fact rate universally quantified and generic statements as being more 
similar when they described generalizable properties (M = 8.34 on a 1–10 scale, SD = 1.37) than 
when they described idiosyncratic properties (M = 8.05, SD = 1.56), Wilcoxon Z = 3.63, p < 
.001. Importantly, however, this difference did not account for the difference found between 
generalization-bias scores for generalizable and idiosyncratic facts. We submitted participants’ 
generalization-bias scores to an OLR with property type (generalizable vs. idiosyncratic) as a 
predictor and similarity/confusability scores as a covariate. As predicted, the main effect of 
property type was replicated even when controlling for the similarity variable: Participants had 
significantly higher generalization-bias scores for the generalizable properties (M = 34.5% more 
“all”-to-generic than generic-to-“all” conversions) than for the idiosyncratic properties (M = 
25.3%), Wald χ²(1) = 7.37, p = .007, d = .15. (We report unadjusted means here and in Table 2 
and the Appendix.) Moreover, the similarity/confusability covariate was not a significant 
predictor of generalization-bias scores, Wald χ²(1) = 1.11, p = .292.8,9 
                                                 
8
 The same results were found with a repeated-measures ANOVA with similarity/confusability as a covariate. 
9
 As an additional means of investigating whether the difference in similarity/confusability was related to the 
difference in generalization-bias scores between generalizable and idiosyncratic properties, we calculated the 
correlation between (1) a generalization-bias difference score (generalization-bias score for generalizable properties 
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 As in Experiment 1, the main effect of property type was replicated at the level of 
individual participants. There were significantly more participants with generalization-bias 
scores in the predicted direction (generalizable > idiosyncratic; 33.3%) than participants with 
generalization-bias scores in the unpredicted direction (idiosyncratic > generalizable; 14.3%), p 
= .017 by a sign test. 
 These findings speak against the possibility that participants’ responses in our task are 
due to a similarity/confusability confound. Instead, it seems more likely that participants are 
spontaneously generalizing the provided quantified information to the relevant kinds whenever 
appropriate, revealing an implicit bias to generalize to kinds. 
                                                                                                                                                             
minus generalization-bias score for idiosyncratic properties) and (2) a similarity/confusability difference score 
(similarity score for generalizable properties minus similarity score for idiosyncratic properties). This correlation 
was non-significant, r(82) = -.08, p = .448, which speaks against the alternative hypothesis tested here and is 
consistent with the non-significant covariate effect reported in the main text. 
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Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
 In this experiment, we addressed an additional alternative explanation for our findings. 
According to this alternative, participants’ responses in Experiments 1 and 2 could have been 
driven entirely by the clues given during the recall phase. To elaborate, the clue words provided 
for the generalizable properties in those experiments were slightly different in content from the 
clue words provided for the idiosyncratic properties (see Table 1): More of the clues for 
generalizable properties  referred to typical animal habitats (e.g., ocean, mountain) and diets 
(e.g., vegetables). Given that elements such as habitats and diets often figure in kind-wide 
properties, participants who saw these clues during the recall phase may have been artificially 
induced to generate statements about kinds even if they hadn’t drawn any kind inferences from 
the original statements (or, for that matter, even if they didn’t remember anything about the 
original statements). It is possible, then, that this asymmetry in the content of the memory clues 
used in the first two studies might explain the greater number of “all”-to-generic (vs. generic-to-
“all”) errors for generalizable properties than for idiosyncratic properties. Experiment 3 was 
conducted to investigate this alternative explanation. Specifically, we presented a new group of 
participants with the clues (both pictures and words) given during the recall phase of 
Experiments 1 and 2 and asked them to generate either generic or universally quantified 
statements using these clues. If the clues alone were driving our effect, we should find more 
generic responses for the clues provided for generalizable properties in the first two studies 
compared to clues provided for the idiosyncratic properties. In contrast, we predict that there will 
be no difference in the number of generic responses between the two sets of clues. 
4.1 Method 
 Participants. Eighty-seven participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
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platform and completed the study online. All were native English speakers residing in the US. 
The reward for participation was $0.75.  
 Procedure. We asked participants to create sentences using exactly the same clues that 
were shown in the recall phase of Experiments 1 and 2. We also provided a few rules to guide 
participants’ sentence creation; these rules were meant to ensure that their expectations about the 
types of sentences they were supposed to generate were similar to those of participants who had 
previously gone through a learning phase (Experiments 1 and 2). Specifically, we asked 
participants to (1) generate full sentences, to (2) begin their sentences with either bare plural 
nouns (e.g., “zorbs”) or universally quantified nouns (e.g., “all zorbs”), and to (3) avoid using the 
same type of beginning across all 16 sentences they would be asked to create. Participants were 
also told that the second clue could be used in another form than it was given (“For example, if 
you are given the word ‘eye,’ you can use the word ‘eyes’ in your sentence instead”). These rules 
were reiterated on each trial, so that participants didn’t have to remember them. Across 
participants, we randomized the order in which the two types of noun phrases (bare plural and 
universally quantified) were mentioned in the rules, so as to avoid biasing participants toward 
using one or the other. 
 Coding. The same coding criteria were used as in Experiments 1 and 2. However, 
because the instructions provided in this study explicitly limited participants’ responses to 
sentences beginning with bare plural nouns or universally quantified nouns, there were almost no 
responses that were ambiguous in scope.
10
 As a result, we did not ask a second researcher to 
code participants’ responses in this study. 
                                                 
10
 Although instructing participants to begin their sentence with a bare plural does not guarantee that they will 
produce a generic statement, in fact in this study they almost always did. 
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4.2 Results and Discussion 
 There was no difference in the number of generic sentences participants generated for 
clues previously provided for facts describing generalizable properties (M = 60.1% of all 
responses) and for clues previously provided for facts describing idiosyncratic properties (M = 
61.4%), Wilcoxon Z = 0.72, p = .470.
11
 This result suggests that our findings in Experiments 1 
and 2—namely, the higher generalization-bias scores for generalizable properties than for 
idiosyncratic properties—were not an artifact of the clues provided during the recall phase. 
Instead, it is more likely that participants were actually misremembering the quantified 
generalizable facts as being about the relevant categories, arguably because of the hypothesized 
bias to make kind generalizations. 
                                                 
11
 Participants produced more generic responses than would be expected by chance (50%) for both sets of clues, 
one-sample Wilcoxon Zs = 4.27 and 4.79, ps <. 001, for the generalizable and the idiosyncratic property clues, 
respectively.  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 Our findings across three studies provide evidence for an implicit, but powerful, bias to 
generalize to kinds. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were more likely to misremember 
quantified statements as generic (rather than the reverse) when those statements described 
generalizable properties as opposed to when they described idiosyncratic properties. This 
difference was also found when participants were under additional cognitive demands 
(Experiment 1), suggesting that the hypothesized bias can operate “under the radar,” without 
taking up much cognitive capacity. Our findings also ruled out two alternative explanations. In 
Experiment 2, we found that the predicted difference in generalization-bias scores between facts 
that describe generalizable and idiosyncratic properties persisted when controlling for the 
perceived similarity/confusability of the “all” and generic forms of these facts. In Experiment 3, 
we demonstrated that the clues provided in the recall phase of Experiments 1 and 2 could not 
have been responsible for the differences observed in generalization-bias scores. Together, these 
studies are consistent with our proposal that people have an implicit bias to make kind 
generalizations—to spontaneously generalize novel information to kinds when such 
generalizations are justifiable.  
To highlight the striking nature of these results, we should point out that there are valid 
considerations that could have prompted participants to convert universal statements about 
idiosyncratic properties to generic form, which would have led to a pattern opposite of what we 
actually observed. Typically, idiosyncratic properties of the sort used in our study apply to fewer 
category members than generalizable properties do (e.g., the norming study in the Method of 
Experiment 1; Cimpian et al., 2010). As a result, universally quantified statements about 
idiosyncratic properties (e.g., “All stups get mud in their hair”) are less plausible than analogous 
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statements about generalizable properties (e.g., “All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables”). In 
principle, then, participants could have preferred to convert universal statements about 
idiosyncratic properties to generic form because generic statements can plausibly be true even if 
there is little statistical evidence to support them (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2010; Leslie, 2008). The 
fact that participants converted instead more of the universal statements about generalizable 
properties to generic form, despite the fact that they were plausible as is, strengthens our claim 
that participants’ behavior in our task was driven by a bias to generalize to kinds.12 
It is also important to note that the present results cannot be explained by, and thus go 
beyond, an ease-of-processing bias of the sort previously proposed in the literature (e.g., 
Hampton, 2012; Leslie & Gelman, 2012). If the only factor driving participants’ responses in our 
task had been a relative difference in the difficulty of processing quantified and generic 
statements (with quantified statements being more effort-intensive to understand, evaluate, store, 
etc., than generic statements), then participants should have converted an equal number of 
quantified statements to generic form across the two property types. The ease-of-processing 
account alone does not predict that quantified statements vary in their computational complexity 
depending on whether they refer to, say, eating fruits and vegetables or getting mud in one’s hair. 
Thus, the greater asymmetry between the number of “all”-to-generic and generic-to-“all” 
memory conversions we observed for generalizable relative to idiosyncratic properties is most 
compatible with, and was predicted a priori by, our argument that human cognition is biased to 
generalize evidence about quantified samples to the entire relevant kinds whenever such 
generalizations are warranted. From a broader perspective, the presence of such a bias is likely to 
                                                 
12
 Although the analyses reported in the main text focused on the generalization-bias scores, not “all”-to-generic 
conversions per se, there were in fact significantly more “all”-to-generic conversions for the generalizable properties 
than for the idiosyncratic properties (Experiment 1: Wald χ²(1) = 13.69, p < .001; Experiment 2: Wald χ²(1) = 11.70, 
p = .001). 
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have a powerful impact on the development of our conceptual knowledge, facilitating the 
acquisition of a tremendous amount of category knowledge from experience with particular 
samples. 
Returning to the present study, our results also suggest that the bias to draw kind 
inferences might operate without making many demands on cognitive resources. We base this 
conclusion on the fact that the effect of property type (i.e., higher generalization-bias scores for 
generalizable than for idiosyncratic properties) was equally strong for participants who were 
under a cognitive load as for those who were not. Thus, the implicit bias to generalize to kinds 
may function not just when people have the luxury of explicitly focusing on learning about 
categories. Rather, this fundamental bias probably operates under most everyday circumstances, 
even when we are engaged in other activities and not deliberately trying to acquire generic 
knowledge.  
Our proposal of a bias to generalize to kinds is compatible in spirit with previous 
hypotheses and evidence from the developmental literature that highlight the privileged status of 
kind representations in human cognition. Consider, for example, the recent claims of an early—
perhaps even innate—sensitivity to social cues that signal the transmission of generic knowledge 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2006, 2009). To illustrate, communicative cues such as eye contact and 
pointing to an object lead 9-month-olds to encode and remember kind-relevant properties of that 
object (e.g., shape, color) rather than kind-irrelevant ones (e.g., location; Yoon, Johnson, & 
Csibra, 2008; see also Futó, Téglás, Csibra, & Gergely, 2010; Butler & Markman, 2012). Such 
ostensive/pedagogical contexts have also been shown to elicit higher rates of generic language 
(Gelman, Ware, Manczak, & Graham, 2013), which provides a very effective means of  
conveying generic knowledge and is understood by children as young as 2 and 3 (e.g., Cimpian 
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& Markman, 2008; Cimpian, Meltzer, & Markman, 2011; Gelman & Raman, 2003; Graham, 
Nayer, & Gelman, 2011). Also related to our present argument, Cimpian and Erickson (2012) 
demonstrated that preschool-age children are better able to recall information that pertains to a 
kind compared to identical information about an individual. Children’s ability to retain kind 
knowledge faithfully in long-term memory dovetails nicely with the proposed implicit bias to 
generalize to kinds and thereby acquire such kind knowledge. 
In conclusion, the current findings suggest that the human mind may be biased to make 
spontaneous kind generalizations whenever the evidence at hand allows such generalizations. 
This bias is likely to exert a powerful—yet often unnoticed—influence on our learning, guiding 
us towards knowledge at the level of abstract kinds. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
The 16 items, in generic and universally quantified format 
 Fact Format 
Property Type Generic Universally Quantified 
   
Generalizable
a
 Cheebas sleep through the winter All cheebas sleep through the winter 
Daxes keep food in their cheeks All daxes keep food in their cheeks 
Reesles like to swim in the ocean All reesles like to swim in the ocean 
Blins sweat through their paws All blins sweat through their paws 
Mooks shed their skin every year All mooks shed their skin every year 
Zorbs eat fruits and vegetables All zorbs eat fruits and vegetables 
Lorches taste with their feet All lorches taste with their feet 
Glippets build their nests on mountain peaks All glippets build their nests on mountain peaks 
   
Idiosyncratic
b
 Stups get mud in their hair All stups get mud in their hair 
Ollers have broken legs All ollers have broken legs 
Ackles get fungus infections in their ears All ackles get fungus infections in their ears 
Kweps chip their teeth on nuts All kweps chip their teeth on nuts 
Zoovs fall out of trees while sleeping All zoovs fall out of trees while sleeping 
Kazzes trip over logs and rocks All kazzes trip over logs and rocks 
Sapers twist their ankles All sapers twist their ankles 
Flooms get dust on their faces All flooms get dust on their faces 
a
The memory clues for the generalizable properties were as follows: “cheeba” and “winter,” 
“dax” and “cheek,” “reesle” and “ocean,” “blin” and “paw,” “mook” and “skin,” “zorb” and 
“vegetable,” “lorch” and “foot,” “glippet” and “mountain.” 
b
The memory clues for the idiosyncratic properties were as follows: “stup” and “hair,” “oller” 
and “leg,” “ackle” and “ear,” “kwep” and “tooth,” “zoov” and “tree,” “kazz” and “rock,” “saper” 
and “ankle,” “floom” and “face.”
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Table 2 
Average percentages for various measures in Experiments 1 and 2, by property type and 
cognitive load (standard deviations in parentheses below) 
 Generalizable Properties Idiosyncratic Properties 
 Expt. 1 Expt. 2 Expt. 1 Expt. 2 
Measure 
Cog. 
Load 
(N = 81) 
No 
Load 
(N = 93) 
No 
Load 
(N = 84) 
Cog. 
Load 
(N = 81) 
No 
Load 
(N = 93) 
No 
Load 
(N = 84) 
       
Generalization-bias score 
(“all”-to-generic minus  
generic-to-“all” conversions) 
25.6 
(62.6) 
22.8 
(61.6) 
34.5 
(60.1) 
 
18.5 
(60.7) 
13.7 
(63.6) 
25.3 
(59.0) 
“All”-to-generic conversions 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as 
generic) 
47.8 
(40.9) 
48.1 
(37.1) 
56.8 
(37.3) 
39.8 
(37.9) 
43.3 
(34.2) 
47.6 
(36.9) 
“All” – correct 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as “all”) 
27.8 
(33.8) 
41.4 
(37.1) 
29.8 
(34.8) 
28.4 
(33.7) 
44.6 
(37.0) 
37.8 
(35.5) 
“All” – other 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as neither 
“all” nor generic, or not 
recalled) 
24.4 
(31.6) 
10.5 
(24.3) 
13.4 
(28.9) 
31.8 
(35.1) 
12.1 
(23.2) 
14.6 
(26.9) 
Generic-to-“all” conversions 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as “all”) 
22.2 
(29.6) 
25.3 
(32.0) 
22.3 
(31.3) 
21.3 
(30.9) 
29.6 
(35.9) 
22.3 
(30.3) 
Generic – correct 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as 
generic) 
50.3 
(38.8) 
64.5 
(35.4) 
64.6 
(35.8) 
45.7 
(39.7) 
58.3 
(36.9) 
61.9 
(34.4) 
Generic – other 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as neither 
generic nor “all,” or not 
recalled) 
27.5 
(33.7) 
10.2 
(23.1) 
13.1 
(27.0) 
33.0 
(34.4) 
12.1 
(25.7) 
15.8 
(29.8) 
Note. The three “all” rows add up to 100% (within each column), as do the three generic rows.
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Appendix 
Table 3 
Raw averages for various measures in Experiments 1 and 2, by property type and cognitive load 
(standard deviations in parentheses below) 
 Generalizable Properties Idiosyncratic Properties 
 Expt. 1 Expt. 2 Expt. 1 Expt. 2 
Measure 
Cog. Load 
(N = 81) 
No 
Load 
(N = 93) 
No 
Load 
(N = 84) 
Cog. Load 
(N = 81) 
No 
Load 
(N = 93) 
No 
Load 
(N = 84) 
       
Generalization-bias score 
(“all”-to-generic minus  
generic-to-“all” conversions) 
1.02 
(2.50) 
0.91 
(2.47) 
1.38 
(2.40) 
0.74 
(2.43) 
0.55 
(2.54) 
1.01 
(2.36) 
“All”-to-generic conversions 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as 
generic) 
1.91 
(1.64) 
1.92 
(1.48) 
2.27 
(1.49) 
1.59 
(1.51) 
1.73 
(1.37) 
1.90 
(1.48) 
“All” – correct 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as “all”) 
1.11 
(1.35) 
1.66 
(1.49) 
1.19 
(1.39) 
1.14 
(1.35) 
1.78 
(1.48) 
1.51 
(1.42) 
“All” – other 
(originally presented “all” 
statements recalled as neither 
“all” nor generic, or not 
recalled) 
0.98 
(1.26) 
0.42 
(0.97) 
0.54 
(1.16) 
1.27 
(1.41) 
0.48 
(0.93) 
0.58 
(1.08) 
Generic-to-“all” conversions 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as “all“) 
0.89 
(1.18) 
1.01 
(1.28) 
0.89 
(1.25) 
0.85 
(1.24) 
1.18 
(1.44) 
0.89 
(1.21) 
Generic – correct 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as 
generic) 
2.01 
(1.55) 
2.58 
(1.42) 
2.58 
(1.43) 
1.83 
(1.59) 
2.33 
(1.48) 
2.48 
(1.38) 
Generic – other 
(originally presented generic 
statements recalled as neither 
generic nor “all,” or not 
recalled) 
1.10 
(1.35) 
0.41 
(0.92) 
0.52 
(1.08) 
1.32 
(1.38) 
0.48 
(1.03) 
0.63 
(1.19) 
Note. The three “all” rows add up to 4 (within each column), as do the three generic rows. 
